Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2000

• Venue

  AAAI/IAAI

• Publication date

  2000-07-03

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Computer Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00077-7
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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