Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2008

• Venue

  Workshop on Internet and Network Economics

• Publication date

  2008-12-17

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Computer Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_36
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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