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Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice

Julien Lesca,Taiki Todo,M. Yokoo

Published 2014 in Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

ABSTRACT

The class of Groves mechanisms has been attracting much attention in called social welfare maximization) and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, when strategic agents can create multiple fake identities and reveal more than one preference under them, a refined characteristic called false-name-proofness is required. Utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness are incompatible in combinatorial auctions, if we also have individual rationality as a desired condition. However, although individual rationality is strongly desirable, if participation is mandatory due to social norms or reputations, a mechanism without individual rationality can be sustained. In this paper we investigate the relationship between utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in a social choice environment with monetary transfers. We show that in our modelization no mechanism simultaneously satisfies utilitarian efficiency, false-name-proofness, and individual rationality. Considering this fact, we ignore individual rationality and design various mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy the other two properties. We also compare our different mechanisms in terms of the distance to individual rationality. Finally we illustrate our mechanisms on a facility location problem.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2014

  • Venue

    Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

  • Publication date

    2014-05-05

  • Fields of study

    Computer Science, Economics

  • Identifiers
    DOI 10.65109/ksop5065
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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