We consider the dispute between causal decision theorists and evidential decision theorists over Newcomb-like problems. We introduce a framework relating causation and directed graphs developed by Spirtes et al. (1993) and evaluate several arguments in this context. We argue that much of the debate between the two camps is misplaced; the disputes turn on the distinction between conditioning on an event E as against conditioning on an event I which is an action to bring about E. We give the essential machinery for calculating the effect of an intervention and consider recent work which extends the basic account given here to the case where causal Knowledge is incomplete.
Conditioning and Intervening
Published 1994 in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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- Publication year
1994
- Venue
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publication date
1994-12-01
- Fields of study
Sociology, Philosophy
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Semantic Scholar
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