Subjective probability of disjunctive hypotheses: local-weight models for decomposition of evidential support.

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  1999

• Venue

  Cognitive Psychology

• Publication date

  1999-02-01

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Medicine, Psychology

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1006/COGP.1998.0706PMID 10090797
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar, PubMed

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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