This paper shows that adding a small application cost to a transfer program can substantially improve targeting through self-selection. Our village-level experiment in Indonesia finds that requiring beneficiaries to apply for benefits results in substantially poorer beneficiaries than automatic enrollment using the same asset test. Marginally increasing application costs on an experimental basis does not further improve targeting. Estimating a model of the application decision implies that the results are largely driven by the nonpoor, who make up the bulk of the population, forecasting that they are unlikely to pass the asset test and therefore not bothering to apply.
Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Vivi Alatas,Ririn Purnamasari,M. Wai-Poi,A. Banerjee,Benjamin A. Olken,Rema Hanna
Published 2016 in Journal of Political Economy
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2016
- Venue
Journal of Political Economy
- Publication date
2016-03-07
- Fields of study
Business, Economics
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-35 of 35 references · Page 1 of 1