Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players.

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.

• Publication year

  2004

• Venue

  Journal of Theoretical Biology

• Publication date

  2004-09-23

• Fields of study

  Biology, Mathematics, Medicine

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.07.019arXiv q-bio/0409026PMID 15498592
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar, PubMed

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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