Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts of evolutionary game theory and review basic properties of deterministic replicator dynamics and stochastic dynamics of finite populations. We discuss stability of equilibria in deterministic dynamics with migration, time-delay, and in stochastic dynamics of well-mixed populations and spatial games with local interactions. We analyze the dependence of the long-run behaviour of a population on various parameters such as the time delay, the noise level, and the size of the population.
Evolutionary Game Theory and Population Dynamics
Published 2007 in arXiv: Populations and Evolution
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2007
- Venue
arXiv: Populations and Evolution
- Publication date
2007-03-28
- Fields of study
Biology, Mathematics, Physics, Computer Science
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
CITED BY
Showing 1-55 of 55 citing papers · Page 1 of 1