Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability

Toke S. Aidt,J. Dutta

Published 2010 in Social Science Research Network

ABSTRACT

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2010

  • Venue

    Social Science Research Network

  • Publication date

    2010-04-01

  • Fields of study

    Economics, Political Science

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

CITATION MAP

EXTRACTION MAP

CLAIMS

  • No claims are published for this paper.

CONCEPTS

  • No concepts are published for this paper.

REFERENCES

Showing 1-44 of 44 references · Page 1 of 1

CITED BY

Showing 1-72 of 72 citing papers · Page 1 of 1