We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.
Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability
Published 2010 in Social Science Research Network
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2010
- Venue
Social Science Research Network
- Publication date
2010-04-01
- Fields of study
Economics, Political Science
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-44 of 44 references · Page 1 of 1
CITED BY
Showing 1-72 of 72 citing papers · Page 1 of 1