This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation. As a result, asymmetric liability on its own may face challenges in the field.
Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes
Klaus Abbink,Utteeyo Dasgupta,Lata Gangadharan,Tarun K. Jain
Published 2013 in Social Science Research Network
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- Publication year
2013
- Venue
Social Science Research Network
- Publication date
2013-09-01
- Fields of study
Law, Business, Economics, Political Science
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Semantic Scholar
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