Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy

Yiquan Gu,Tobias Wenzel

Published 2014 in Journal of Industrial Economics

ABSTRACT

This paper studies obfuscation decisions by firms. We show that more prominent firms are more likely to obfuscate. While prominent firms always choose maximum obfuscation, the obfuscation by less prominent firms depends on the degree of asymmetry in prominence and consumer protection policy. We evaluate the impact of a consumer protection policy that limits the scope of obfuscation. We show that such a policy may not be effective as less prominent firms may increase their obfuscation practice.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2014

  • Venue

    Journal of Industrial Economics

  • Publication date

    2014-12-01

  • Fields of study

    Law, Business, Economics

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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REFERENCES

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