Why phishing works

Rachna Dhamija,J. D. Tygar,Marti A. Hearst

Published 2006 in International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems

ABSTRACT

To build systems shielding users from fraudulent (or phishing) websites, designers need to know which attack strategies work and why. This paper provides the first empirical evidence about which malicious strategies are successful at deceiving general users. We first analyzed a large set of captured phishing attacks and developed a set of hypotheses about why these strategies might work. We then assessed these hypotheses with a usability study in which 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked to determine which ones were fraudulent. We found that 23% of the participants did not look at browser-based cues such as the address bar, status bar and the security indicators, leading to incorrect choices 40% of the time. We also found that some visual deception attacks can fool even the most sophisticated users. These results illustrate that standard security indicators are not effective for a substantial fraction of users, and suggest that alternative approaches are needed.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2006

  • Venue

    International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems

  • Publication date

    2006-04-22

  • Fields of study

    Computer Science

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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