Enactivism, Representations and Canonical Neurons

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2016

• Venue

  Argumentation

• Publication date

  Unknown publication date

• Fields of study

  Sociology, Philosophy

• Identifiers

  No identifiers available.

• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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