This paper constructs a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining to study how fluctuations in bargaining power affect the outcomes of negotiations. The paper deals with the technical complexities that arise when modeling games in continuous time by building strategy restrictions into the equilibrium definition. These restrictions select a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations. This unique equilibrium corresponds to the limiting subgame perfect equilibrium of discrete-time bargaining games with frequent offers.
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2019
- Venue
Games Econ. Behav.
- Publication date
2019-01-01
- Fields of study
Computer Science, Economics
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-29 of 29 references · Page 1 of 1
CITED BY
Showing 1-57 of 57 citing papers · Page 1 of 1