Regulating Collusion

We attempt to provide a systemic view of the process of regulating collusion, including detection and prosecution as well as bargaining between firms and regulators via consent orders, the production of evidence, and containment measures that may be taken if collusion cannot be addressed with more direct means. In addition, we try to do justice to the peculiarities of the legal system: Modeling the courts as they are, rather than as economists think they should be, is essential for economic analysis to improve the way collusion is regulated. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 15 is August 2023. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

• Publication year

  2023

• Venue

  Annual Review of Economics

• Publication date

  2023-03-27

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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