We empirically assess the implications of the common ownership hypothesis from a historical perspective using the set of S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2017. We show that the dramatic rise in common ownership in the time series is driven primarily by the rise of indexing and diversification and, in the cross section, by investor concentration, which the theory presumes to drive a wedge between cash flow rights and control. We also show that the theory predicts incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the widely held firm. (JEL D22, G32, G34, L21, L25)
Common Ownership in America: 1980–2017
M. Backus,Christopher T. Conlon,Michael Sinkinson
Published 2019 in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
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- Publication year
2019
- Venue
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Publication date
2019-01-01
- Fields of study
Business, Economics
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