The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2015

• Venue

  The Review of International Organizations

• Publication date

  2015-04-02

• Fields of study

  Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/S11558-015-9220-1
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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