Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes

A. Guzman,B. Simmons

Published 2005 in The Journal of Legal Studies

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within the World Trade Organization's system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly retaliation. The capacity hypothesis predicts that low‐income states will tend to complain about behavior by high‐income states because the latter offer a higher expected return. We test these two hypotheses and find considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no support for the power hypothesis. We conclude that poor states behave differently than their rich counterparts because they lack the financial, human, and institutional capital to participate fully in the dispute resolution system.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2005

  • Venue

    The Journal of Legal Studies

  • Publication date

    2005-06-01

  • Fields of study

    Economics, Political Science

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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