The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.
Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity
A. Traulsen,N. Shoresh,M. Nowak
Published 2008 in Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
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PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2008
- Venue
Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
- Publication date
2008-04-02
- Fields of study
Biology, Mathematics, Medicine
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar, PubMed
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