Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  1995

• Venue

  Journal of Economic Theory

• Publication date

  1995-08-01

• Fields of study

  Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1006/JETH.1995.1050
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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