We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibria. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.
Nash and Wardrop Equilibria in Aggregative Games With Coupling Constraints
Dario Paccagnan,Basilio Gentile,F. Parise,M. Kamgarpour,J. Lygeros
Published 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2017
- Venue
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Publication date
2017-02-28
- Fields of study
Engineering, Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-60 of 60 references · Page 1 of 1