Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2008

• Venue

  Econometrica

• Publication date

  2008-10-02

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.3982/ECTA8354
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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