Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2017

• Venue

  Journal of Economics Theory

• Publication date

  2017-03-01

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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