Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2014

• Venue

  Operational Research

• Publication date

  2014-08-01

• Fields of study

  Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1287/opre.2014.1276
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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